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Abstract
For almost two decades, the public debate about Islam inWestern Europe has been dominated by concerns about the lack
of gender equality in the racializedMuslim population. There has been a tendency to victimize “theMuslimwoman” rather
than to encourage Muslim women’s participation in the public debate about their lives. This contribution to the study of
discourses on Muslim women is an analysis of arguments written by Muslims about women’s rights. The data consists of
239 texts written by self-definedMuslims inmajor Norwegian newspapers about women’s rights. I will discuss two findings
from the study. The first is an appeal to be personal when discussing issues of domestic violence and racism is combined
with an implicit and explicit demand to represent all Muslims in order to get published in newspapers—which creates an
ethno-religious threshold for participation in the public debate. The second finding is that, across different positions and
different religious affiliations, from conservative to nearly secular, and across the timeline, from 2000 to 2012, there is a
dominant understanding of women’s rights as individual autonomy. These findings will be discussed from different theo-
retical perspectives to explore how arguments for individual autonomy can both challenge and amplify neoliberal agendas.
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1. Introduction
“It is at this point a political action to tell it like it is, to say
what I really believe about my life instead of what I’ve al-
ways been told to say”, writes Carol Hanich (1970, p. 24)
in her essay with the iconic title The Personal is Political.
The year is 1969 andHanich iswriting about thewomen’s
movement consciousness-raising meetings. Giving polit-
ical and social problems their proper name was part of
the success of the women’s movement. The rhetorical
move of making the personal political has been a dom-
inant strategy for several political movements, where
counter-publics have been used to give idioms, notions,
and narratives and raise the consciousness of marginal-
ized groups in society (Andersen, 2014; Brown, 1995;
Fraser, 2000). Thus, it is not surprising that the present
analysis of Muslims’ arguments for women’s rights in the
Norwegian media sphere show that “I” was frequently
used and the use of personal anecdotes and narratives
was a dominant rhetorical strategy to address racism
andwomen’s oppression.What is more surprising is that,
across different positions and religious affiliations, from
conservative to nearly secular, and across the timeline,
from 2000 to 2012, there is a dominant understanding
of gender equality as individual autonomy.
For two decades the western public debate about
Islam has been dominated by concerns about the lack
of gender equality in the racialized Muslim population.
There has been a tendency to describe “Muslim women”
rather than encourage participation by the women who
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are under scrutiny (Abu-Lughod, 2013; Ahmed, 2011;
Göle, 2013; Scott, 2007; van Es, 2016). Studies of the Nor-
wegian and Dutch media discourse of migrant and Mus-
lim women have found that the growing attention paid
to “Muslim” women’s perceived lack of emancipation
and the accusation that Islam oppresses women have
turned “being oppressed” into a stigma (van Es, 2016).
The discourse of the oppressed Muslim woman creates
a counter stereotype of the “Western woman” as mod-
ern, progressive, secular, highly educated and active in
the labour market (Benn & Jawad, 2003, pp. 1–17). This
juxtaposition indicates that the discourse of the Muslim
woman in theNorwegian andWestern-European context
forms the general public discourse about gender equality
and women’s rights (Scharff, 2011).
The data for my research is every text written by self-
defined Muslims in op-eds or in the debate section in
major Norwegian newspapers about women’s rights be-
tween 2000 and 2012. The archive consists of 239 texts.
In this article, I have focused on two findings from a
larger study of topics concerning the controversies about
women’s rights and Islam in the media debate (Helseth,
2017). The main aim is not to cover all arguments and
topics concerning women’s right in the text archive, but
to discuss the rhetorical use of the personal narrative
when arguing for women’s rights and the topos of indi-
vidual autonomy.
This article is divided into six sections, including this
introduction. The second section is a description of the
methodology. The third section shows that Muslims are
being personal when they argue for women’s rights
through their use of experience, family background and
anecdotes and that, simultaneously, they are met with
both explicit and implicit demands to represent Mus-
lims as a group. I argue that these two factors—being
personal, almost private, and representing a collective—
create an ethno-religious threshold in theNorwegianme-
dia debate. In the fourth section, I show that individ-
ual autonomy is an important topos in arguments for
women’s rights. In the fifth section, I discuss how the ten-
dencies towards individualization of the public debate
and the topos of personal autonomy can both challenge
and amplify the neoliberal agenda. Finally, in the sixth
section I make some concluding remarks.
2. Methodology
I have analysed texts written byMuslims about women’s
rights that were published in national or regional news-
papers between 2000 and 2012. Through the use of a
Norwegian media database, Retriever, I have collected
texts using five criteria: (1) the texts are written by a per-
son who claims to be a Muslim or represent a Muslim or-
ganization. Thus, I apply a broad definition of “Muslim”.
There is no objective definition of being a Muslim, and
the boundaries of the definition are one of the contested
issues in the discussion of the category Muslim (Leirvik,
2009; Roald, 2004). (2) The 239 items are written texts.
This criterion excludes interviews and participation in TV
debates because I want to analyse arguments as close to
the writers’ own words and agendas as possible. (3) The
texts are published in a regional or national newspaper,
which means an editor before publication has approved
them. (4) The topic of the text is women’s rights, as the
writer understands them. If the writer claims to be argu-
ing for women’s rights, the text is part of the sample. The
topics of the texts include, for example, honour-killing,
forcedmarriage, critiques of themedia stereotype of the
“Muslim” woman as oppressed, patriarchal social con-
trol, racism, Islamic feminism, arguments for Islam as a
women-friendly religion and arguments that perceive Is-
lamas oppressive. There is great heterogeneity in thema-
terial. (5) The texts were published during the timeframe
of 2000 to 2012.
Following these five criteria, I have constructed an
archive of 239 texts. On the one hand there are sub-
stantial advantages in creating a body of data because
it makes it possible to be quite specific about how Nor-
wegian Muslims argue for women’s rights in the media
sphere. On the other hand, it limits the perspective. This
is not a study of the totality of the media debate about
Islam, women’s rights or the multicultural society. And
the archive is not representative of all Norwegian Mus-
lims’ views on women’s rights. Rather, the archive con-
sists of Muslims’ arguments for women’s rights that the
mainstreammedia was willing to publish, and this makes
it possible to analyse what could be seen as both implicit
and explicit demands in the media debate.
The text was coded using qualitative software to re-
veal patterns of idiom and argumentation. There are
several methods to analyse texts in the social sciences,
and the reasons here for applying a version of discourse
analysis inspired by Carol Bacchi’s question “what is
the problem represented to be?” (Bacchi, 2009), the
WPR approach, and classical rhetorical theory (Aristote-
les, 2006/340 BC; Kjeldsen, 2006; Rosengren, 2008) are
based on the data material and my research interests.
The texts as a genre are rhetorical, and a rhetorical the-
ory gives the opportunity to preserve the writer’s in-
tention (“ethos”) and the emotional investment and in-
tensity of the argument (“pathos”), while giving a so-
cial context to the arguments by an analysis of “topoi”.
Topoi are the plural form of topos, which translates from
Greek as “place”. In the analysis, it is used as the mental
place that gives arguments their authority. Topoi can be
understood both in terms of which persons and ethos
have a legitimate right to participate in the discourse,
which arguments (logos) are valid and which normative
ideals are seen as unquestionably good. The possibil-
ity of persuading somebody depends on you agreeing
on something, and this something is “topoi”. Aristote-
les (2006/340 BC) states that there are three modes of
persuasion, through ethos, pathos and logos. In this ar-
ticle, the topoi of ethos arguments are particularly rele-
vant. Ethos is the speaker’s trustworthiness; the perfor-
mance, the mode of speaking, but also the social back-
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ground, clothes and dialect. An ethos argument presup-
poses that the speaker understands what is convincing
for the audience to whom she is speaking. Studying pat-
terns of ethos arguments, of how the writers position
themselves in the texts, signals what the readers presum-
ably find convincing. An examination ofwhich arguments
seem convincing reveals demands on ethos, on who she
needs “to be” in order to be heard and what she needs
to say to convince the group to whom she is speaking.
Thus, the analysis has the potential to reveal social struc-
tures and hierarchies in the society where the speaker
performs her arguments.
Carol Bacchi’s (2009) WPR approach presupposes
that we are governed by “problematisations”. Thus, to
analyse what the problem is represented to be is a way
of understanding the underlying discourses of what is
seen as a political or social problem. These “problema-
tisations” form the imagined and implemented political
solutions in society. Thus, by analysing the problem rep-
resentations in the arguments, we gain clarity about the
dominant discourses that form the ways in which we
speak or think about what is a good and just society.
In conclusion, I have used a rhetorical analysis of
topoi and an understanding taken from Bacchi’s WPR ap-
proach to analyse the dominant ethos in the arguments,
the politics of the personal, and the topos of personal au-
tonomy. In the following sections, I translate all quotes
from the texts.
3. The Politics of the Personal
There are several indications that point to individualiza-
tion when Muslims argue for women’s rights. Firstly, the
analyses of the timeline show that the classical multi-
culturalism argument (Modood, 2011), which assumes
that cultural traditions and practices should have special
protection because they are a part of a minority culture,
disappears in 2004. This indicates that the struggle for
rights as a minority group is not central to the argumen-
tation after 2004 and that the individual is the preferred
entity to argue for rights. Secondly, 239 texts are coded
in qualitative software that gives the opportunity to do
word counts, and “I” was used 1307 times. Literally, this
is to take words out of context, but it is nevertheless an
indication that the use of first-person narratives is im-
portant in the texts, and this leads to the third point.
The analyses of argumentation show that first person-
narratives and personal experience are used to highlight
racial discrimination and women’s oppression. Personal
biographies, family relations and religious beliefs seem
like significant parts of the arguments’ topoi (Helseth,
2017, pp. 151–164). They must to some degree have the
legitimate right to speak. I will give one example. Am-
breen Perez (2010, p. 23) writes about social control by
the ethnic majority in Norway:
I have experienced sarcastic comments like: “It would
have been better to see you in a mini-skirt than
with that cloth on your head”, “You are not west-
ern anymore, now you are one of those “gardinfolka”
(“curtain people”). “Paki-whore” is another example
that ethnic Norwegian women who convert to Islam
have heard.
The frequent use of “I”, the disappearing argument of
classical multiculturalism and the use of personal expe-
rience together signal an individualization of the Norwe-
gian multicultural debate. But there is also a tendency to
implicitly and explicitly indicate that the “I” represents
Muslims as a group.
One of the criteria for the text archive is, as men-
tioned, is that you are a Muslim and write from a posi-
tion of being part of theMuslim community. Some of the
writers use this positioning to legitimize a critical stance
towards their own group. Lily Bandehy (2009a, p. 47) ar-
gues for a hijab ban and writes:
I am a refugee from Iranwho grewup in aMuslim fam-
ily. Islam is a part of my identity and it is a part of me,
and nobody can accuse me of suffering from Islamo-
phobia. But both manymodernMuslims and I wish to
ban the hijab in the public sphere in Norway.
Bandehy signals her Muslim identity to legitimize her
ethos as a speaker for the group. She uses this ethos to
represent “modern Muslims” and to indicate that she is
an insider and knows what the group wants. She also
uses the ethos to avoid accusations of “Islamophobia”.
The group identity is not only used to criticize Islam in
the text archive, but also to defend it from generalization,
par example when Shabana Rehman (2009, p. 10) writes:
“I am a radical Muslim” as her, answer to a claim that Is-
lam in itself is destructive. Bushra Ishaq (2010, p. 56) de-
scribes the stigmatization and discrimination she has ex-
perienced because she is a publicly well-known Muslim.
In addition to these examples of group representa-
tion, there are two modes of argumentation that reveal
the problem with the ethos of representing Muslims as
a group: the accusation of speaking “with two tongues”
and to be a “coconut”.
Walid al-Kubaisi (2006, p. 2) claims that Muslim
spokespersons “speak with two tongues”, one in which
they praise acts of terror for their own group and a
public voice that condemns the same actions. Shabana
Rehman (2002, p. 4) accuses Pakistani men of “double
standards”. Again Bandehy (2009b, p. 40) accuses the
politician Abid Raja of participating in a “dangerous dou-
ble game”. Through delegitimizing other writers’ ethos,
they are highlighting an ethos of truth. The use of the ad-
jective “double” to describe the others’ position makes
sense as long as there is a mistrust of the Muslim group
ethos in the public debate. Accusations of being duplic-
itous can be warranted by the lack of trust between Is-
lamic organizations and the Norwegian media public.
The other accusation that also concerns belonging to
a racialized group are the label “coconut” used by Iffit
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Quershi (2006, p. 4). Being a “coconut” implies that one
has the wrong ethnic loyalty, and the argument attacks
the ethos of the speaker and not the logos. The warrant
of the argument as racialized is that, if they criticize their
ethnic group for such things as lack of gender equality,
they do it because they have internalized the negative
views held by the majority society.
Both of these arguments have a questionable way of
placing the emphasis on group loyalty, and that what you
are is more important than what you say. The supposi-
tion is that both arguments are connected to the writer’s
ethnicity, or more specifically to their ethno-religious
background. The reason why both labels are valid is that
the accused writer has a Muslim background.
Together, the combination of the distinctive use of
a personal narrative to be given a voice and an ex-
plicit and implicit demand to represent all Muslims cre-
ates what I have labelled an ethno-religious threshold
for Muslims who participate in the public debate about
women’s rights. This threshold is unjust because it pre-
vents parity of participation and hinders an opportunity
to have a voice about matters that concern your life.
White feminists who participate in the debate about vi-
olence against women are not necessarily met with de-
mands to talk about their personal lives, and their views
are not interpreted as the views of all white women, but
are often seen as individual views on the situation.
The intertwining of the personal narrative and the po-
litical issue may cause and increase a particular form of
argumentation by which, if the writer’s personal narra-
tive (ethos) is questioned, the political issue can also be
undermined. This could lead to a self-reinforcing negative
spiral, where an attack on the ethos becomes more cen-
tral than what the writer is actually arguing, the logos.
Feminist and postcolonial critics have targeted the
fact that some people’s situated knowledge has been re-
duced to being singular and particular, but others’ voices,
perspectives and experiences have been understood as
universal (Beauvoir, 1997; Mohanty, 2003; Ortner, 1972).
The criticism can be summed up like this: if a person
writes, talks and experiences from a marked position as
an “other”, then that position is seen as exceptional and
one that cannot represent the human condition or uni-
versal human experience. Here, themarked position as a
Muslim indicates that you should be more personal than
others and at the same time seem to represent a collec-
tive identity.
4. The Topos of Individual Autonomy
Through the use of Carol Bacchi’s (2009) methodology of
asking “what is the problem represented to be?” I found
that in almost all of the 239 texts the political problem
was represented to be a lack of individual autonomy
(Helseth, 2017, pp. 117–139). The text archive consists
of a variety of positions and opinions. But whether the
argument is for wearing the niqab, questioning the sta-
tus of the hijab, arguments against forced marriage or
against postcolonial paternalism, the problem is repre-
sented to be women’s lack of individual autonomy. The
writers disagree on what hinders women’s individual au-
tonomy, but they all use the same topos.
The first group of arguments describes the problem
to be the lack of critique of patriarchal collective cul-
ture in the minority community, which hinders women’s
personal autonomy. The second group of arguments de-
scribes the problem to be the labelling ofMuslimwomen
as oppressed, which hinders personal autonomy. The
first group of arguments is founded on the binary op-
position between individual freedom and a collective-
oriented culture. Shabana Rehman in particular gives
voice to the fight against the collective-oriented culture
“where the individual barely exists” (Rehman, 2005a,
p. 47) and young people pay “with their own blood”
(Rehman, 2005b, p. 4) in the fight for “individual free-
dom”(Rehman, 2005b, p. 4.) In this group of arguments,
gender equality is defined as liberation from collective-
oriented culture and religious norms. The definition of
individual autonomy is the act of liberating yourself from
an oppressive background.
The second group of arguments describes the binary
opposition as between the right to be seen as an indi-
vidual with agency and being labelled as oppressed. Ali
Athar (2002, p. 34) states that for “many youths, among
them girls, the opportunity to live according to their own
beliefs, traditions and to be different within Norwegian
society is a problem”. In arguments for the right to wear
the hijab, the most central is individual agency (Akran,
2004, p. 50; Alghazari, 2012, p. 23; Hassan, 2010, p. 13,
2011, p. 16; Khan, 2009, p. 22; Mahmood, 2009, p. 22;
Pervez, 2010, p. 4; Raja, 2009, p. 38; Rafiq, 2002, p. 51;
Tajamal, 2009, p. 3).
There are four different ways to validate the argu-
ment: (1) that women’s choice of clothing is a private is-
sue as opposed to a public concern; (2) in terms of the
right to personal autonomy over your own body; (3) as a
phenomenon that the majority society has problems to
see as a free choice; and (4) as clothing that the writers
themselves have chosen to wear.
The right to value and perform cultural and Islamic
traditions is framed as a question of personal autonomy.
The right to choose a way of life that contrasts with the
dominant majority culture is described as a token of in-
dividual autonomy. Both groups of arguments frame the
problem to be collective cultural norms. In the first group,
they target patriarchal cultural and religious norms and
in the second group they target the cultural norms of
the majority.
5. Neoliberal Individualism and Feminism
In the previous three sections, I have presented the
methodology of my study of how Norwegian Muslims
argue for women’s rights, along with two empirical find-
ings: the ethos of the personal narrative combined with
collective representation and the topos of individual au-
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tonomy. In this, section the findings will be discussed
through the lens of how the individualization of the politi-
cal discourse can both amplify and challenge a neoliberal
agenda. A common understanding of neoliberalism is as
a political economic system that:
[P]roposes that human well-being can best be ad-
vanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial free-
doms and skills within an institutional framework
characterized by strong private property rights, free
markets and free trade. (Harvey, 2005, p. 2)
Even though this is a definition of neoliberalism that tar-
gets economic policies affecting a large number of cit-
izens across the world, it is not the economic agenda
that I wish to discuss here. Therefore, Wendy Brown’s
(2005, 2015) definition of a neoliberal rationality is more
appropriate. Brown poses the question of what is new
in neoliberalism and answers that it is deploying a form
of governmentality “that reaches from the soul of the
citizen” (Brown, 2005, p. 39). She describes neoliberal-
ism as a form of rationality that is “extending and dis-
semination market values to all institutions and social
action” (Brown, 2005, p. 40). Central to her definition
is the notion of homo œconomicus; the embodiment
of market rationality which also becomes the gold stan-
dard for human behaviour in every sphere of life. The
neo in neoliberalism is, according to Brown, a change in
morality, whereby all human actions, policies and politi-
cal rhetoric aremeasured against a standard of profitabil-
ity, a neoliberal economization (Brown, 2015, pp. 28–35).
She states: “Within neoliberal rationality, human capital
is both our “is” and our “ought”—what we are said to
be, what we should be, and what the rationality makes
us into through its norms and construction of environ-
ments” (Brown, 2015, p. 36).
Brown describes a rather grim vision of the future of
the liberal democracy where homo œconomicus has re-
placed homopoliticus.When liberty is relocated frompo-
litical to economic life, the purpose of participating is not
to develop moral autonomy and gain insights into your
own views and desires; your desires are predefined by
the logic of the market. Neoliberal individualism is the
right to participate in a market, but without the possibil-
ity of changing the rules of competition, the goal is profit
and by earning you are doing the right thing. Brown’s con-
text is the USA and she argues against the economization
of every sector of society. The Norwegian context is dif-
ferent in the sense that we have a welfare state, even
though the rhetoric of the market is having a great im-
pact, for example, in the sphere of higher education (Hes-
sen, 2017). However, I find her concept of neoliberal ra-
tionality and normativity fruitful in the discussion of my
findings of how Norwegian Muslims argue for women’s
rights. I start with a discussion of the topos of individ-
ual autonomy.
Self-realization, individuality andmodernity are inter-
twined entities, and it is tempting to suggest that Mus-
lims who argue for women’s rights are part of the zeit-
geist of modern societies when they emphasize personal
autonomy. As part of the project of modernity, your
personal choices reveal your individuality and tell the
story of who you are (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Gid-
dens, 1997; Gullestad, 2006). As a consequence, there
is also a battle for who can be understood as a subject
of free will. This battle has a particular colonial history,
as Gayatri Spivak (1988/2009) shows in her influential
essay in which she discusses whether there is a possi-
bility for the subaltern to speak. Spivak describes how
the British colonial regime uses the powerful discourse
of saving the brown women from brown men to legit-
imize their occupation by banning the tradition of widow
burning, sati. In consequence, the Indian woman is an
object. On the other hand, the Indian nationalist argu-
ment is that Indian women are willing to die, and the
self-sacrificing woman is described as a subject, a token
of Indian nationalist nostalgia. Since saving the Muslim
(“brown”) women is still used within an imperialist and
racist agenda (Abu-Lughod, 2013; Ahmed, 2011; Göle,
2013; Scott, 2007; van Es, 2016), it is understandable that
Muslims in the Norwegian public debate argue for their
right to agency, to be seen as modern individuals with
free will. But this raises two questions: who defines what
agency is? And agency over what?
Wendy Brown is critical of the dominant understand-
ing of choice in the western hijab debate. In this debate,
there is a false dichotomy between morally autonomous
western women and Muslim hijab-wearing women.
The idea that Western women choose while Islamic
women are coerced ignores the extent to which all
choice is conditioned by as well as imbricated with
power, and the extent to which choice itself is an
impoverished account of freedom, especially political
freedom. (Brown, 2012, p. 10)
Saba Mahmood (2005) criticizes the Eurocentric views
of agency that are relentlessly tied to the political goal
of personal autonomy in western feminist philosophy
and studies. In Mahmood’s study of conservative Egyp-
tian Salafi women, “thewestern feminist” understanding
of agency does not apply. Mahmood states that the de-
sire to submit to God and undermine your own desires
is not possible to understand in the feminist vocabulary
of agency, which has personal autonomy as its supreme
goal. These religious women want to form their selves
within a collective religious frame—and this process is
not deterministic but situated. TheNorwegian anthropol-
ogist Christine Jacobsen (2011) uses Mahmood’s think-
ing in her analyses of young Norwegian Muslims’ self-
understanding. These young women interpret and bend
religious norms and demands into a vocabulary of choice,
autonomy and authenticity, in ways that mix their de-
mands for personal autonomy with religious norms. Ja-
cobsen’s use of Mahmood can contribute to contextual-
izing the demand for personal autonomy. The ideal of
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personal autonomy can be framed as a colonial idea that
makes it difficult to understandMuslim women’s actions
and views as self-determined by usingWestern women’s
lives, experiences and ideas as an unquestionable stan-
dard against which every woman is measured. This is a
valuable critique, but it does not give answers to what
role personal autonomy should have in a feminist agenda
for a just society.
In Anne Phillips’ (2007)Multiculturalism without Cul-
ture, she states that persons have rights, not cultures or
religions, and tries to formulate universal standards for a
justmulticultural society. Her three norms are: to protect
minors from harm, to prevent physical and mental vio-
lence, and to ensure that men and women are treated as
equals (Phillips, 2007, p. 34). Personal autonomy, accord-
ing to Phillips, is not sufficient to ensure gender equality.
She thinks that there is an embedded tension between
personal autonomy and equality because people have a
tendency to make choices that sustain hierarchies. The
opportunity to choose has to be seen in relation to how
the sum of the gender-conservative choices conforms to
and amplifies gender norms and hierarchies. Choices are
conditioned as well as imbricated by power, as Wendy
Brown describes, and Phillips would add that they are al-
ways made within a cultural context—a context that is
not static or unchangeable, but still forms our desires and
the choices we make.
In the text archive, the dominant topos is individ-
ual autonomy; even the most conservative Muslims use
the right to choose as a central argument. The topos of
personal autonomy can be used to amplify a neoliberal
agenda and can be seen as part of the tendency labelled
“choice feminism” (Thwaites, 2017). Rachel Thwaites cri-
tiques the use of the choice narrative in feminism. The
topos of “choice feminism” is that a woman should
be able to do whatever she wants. Thus, choice femi-
nism strives to be inclusive and not condemn individual
women’s choices. The problem, according to Thwaites
(2017), is that this is also part of the pervasive neolib-
eral rhetoric of choice and it hinders a necessary political
discussion of the cultural norms, political practices and
economic inequalities that inform our individual choices.
Even though Thwaites writes about women who choose
to take their husband’s name in Britain, her discussion
is informative for an understanding of the topos of per-
sonal autonomywhenMuslims argue for women’s rights
in Norway.When the topos of personal autonomy is used
to understandwomen’s rights, one needs to ask:who has
agency, and agency over what? This leads to a further dis-
cussion of how feminism is understood in relation to ne-
oliberalism in the Norwegian public debate and probably
in other countries in the Global North. However, individ-
ual autonomy should not be abandoned or delegitimized
as a political goal, and it could also be essential to chal-
lenge the neoliberal agenda, as I will show in the discus-
sion of the next finding.
In Section 4, I make an argument that there is an
ethno-religious threshold that is unjust becauseMuslims
are met with demands to be both personal and at the
same time seen as representing a collective. This norma-
tive judgment is based on an ideal of everyone having
a right to moral autonomy. In 1944 essay We Refugees,
Hannah Arendt writes about the paradoxes of being
an individual and also part of the collective of Jewish
refugees: “If we are saved we feel humiliated, and if
we are helped we feel degraded. We fight like madmen
for private existences with individual destinies” (Arendt,
1943/1994, p. 114).
In Arendt’s agonistic individualism, which has also
been labelled “democratic individualism” (Kateb, 1994),
one can first appear as an individual when one recog-
nizes the reciprocal right of others to do the same. “The
end of the common world has come when it is seen only
under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in
only one perspective” (Arendt, 1998, p. 58). Arendt ex-
plicitly defends the individual voice, and what makes her
theory and reflections particularly relevant to this arti-
cle is that she defends the individual voice in relation to
a marked identity as Jewish (Scholem & Arendt, 1964).
Her ideal for public debate is for everyone to have the op-
portunity to speak with a personal voice, to speak one’s
truth, doxa, while simultaneously being part of a collec-
tive identity as Jewish, and to claim what is universal,
what should be true, good and right for all. And everyone
should be able to move between these modes of argu-
ment. Arendt’s individualism is far from the neoliberal ra-
tionality that has reduced a normative standard of moral
autonomy to a narrow understanding of self-interest. As
Arendt writes elsewhere:
As Jews we want to fight for the freedom of the Jew-
ish people, because “If I am not for me—who is for
me?” As Europeans we want to fight for the freedom
of Europe, because “If I am only for me—who am I?”
(cited in Butler, 2007, p. 27)
Arendt’s moral autonomy is an individualism that is de-
pendent on the social context and the collective iden-
tities that “one merely belongs to” (Scholem & Arendt,
1964). Arendt’s ideal of public debate makes it possible
to examine what is wrong when racialized individuals are
held responsible for the collective and are presumed to
have a certain kind of loyalty to their own group. And at
the same time, we must not abandon the moral respon-
sibility to fight for freedom. In Arendt’s ideal of public de-
bate, one should be able to represent a difference with-
out being reduced to that difference, and I argue that she
can be a starting point for developing an individualism
that challenges the neoliberal agenda.
6. Conclusion
In this article, I have presented two findings from a study
of how Norwegian Muslims argue for women’s rights.
The first finding is that an ethno-religious threshold is cre-
ated in the debate by the demand that Muslims have to
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both be personal and at the same time represent a collec-
tive, and the second finding is that the dominant founda-
tion of the arguments for women’s rights is individual au-
tonomy. I have used Wendy Brown’s definition of neolib-
eral rationality as a starting point for the discussion of the
findings. If the topos of autonomy is not subjected to crit-
ical scrutiny of who is seen to have agency, and agency
over what, it could both amplify discrimination and lead
to an impoverished academic and political discourse. But,
the critical scrutiny should not lead to an abandonment
of the norm, but to a better understanding of the topos
of individual autonomy in the public media debate about
Islam and women’s rights. I make an argument that Han-
nah Arendt’s “democratic individualism” can emphasize
the right to simultaneously be an individual voice, be part
of a collective identity and argue for what is universally
good for all. The rhetorical tool of making the personal
political, as Carol Hanich (1970) argues, is a necessary
and powerful political tool that has proved to be espe-
cially important for marginalized groups within society.
It is crucial in the struggle for a more just society that the
marginalized find their voice, but the ways in which they
are given a voice and what it is possible for them to claim
needs critical discussion. Hopefully, this article can be a
contribution to this dialogue.
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